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Abstract 
  
The traditional concept of a strict minimum of necessary consumption and nontaxable 
income equal for all taxpayers embedded in most current income-tax systems is the 
result of a paradox of fiscal egalitarianism. The paper shows that substituting the 
traditional notion of a strict minimum of nontaxable income (Surplus Income Tax 
Method) for a scheme of growing personal allowances to meet the amounts of 
necessary consumption required by the different living standards of the taxpayers 
(Discretionary Income Tax Method) generates an income-tax scheme more progressive 
than the traditional one. In the paper we also show that this alternative proposal for 
nontaxable incomes generates an after-tax income distribution less unequal (Lorenz 
dominance) and superior in terms of social welfare (Atkinson, 1970).   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In current income tax systems there is a trend towards simplification of taxation.  
Several reforms introducing flat rate taxes have being adopted (Auerbach, 2006; OCDE, 
2006; Banks and Diamond, 2008; Domínguez Martínez and López del Paso, 2008; 
Domínguez Martínez, 2009; Keen et al, 2000). These reforms reduce managerial costs 
and deterrence effects from taxation. However, fiscal systems based on flat rates taxes 
or dual income-taxes can be reconciled with the values of equity and progressivity 
which lie at the heart of taxation principles. Keen et al (2000) have shown that 
increasing personal allowances leads to decreasing inequality degrees in after-tax 
income distributions (residual progression) whenever the proportionate reduction in tax 
payments be greater for the poor than for the rich. This is the case when personal 
allowances have income elasticity less than one and there are flat rates.  
The literature on progressive taxation and its justification on the grounds of minimal 
equal sacrifice has evolved since the classical formulation by Samuelson (1947) to the 
current developments that shed light on the links between tax progressivity and the 
concavity of utility functions (Moyes, 2003, Mitra and Ok, 1997, Young, 1990). On the 
other hand, the links between tax progressivity and the reduction of the inequality in the 
after-tax income distribution have been widely studied (Atkinson, 1970, Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 1987, Shorrocks, 1983)1 .  
In analyzing the effects of tax reforms on progressivity, Keen et al (2000) study the 
impact of increasing personal allowances in progressive taxes on the concentration in 
the tax rates (liability progression) and the unequal distribution of after-tax income 
(residual income progression). They show that if the degree of progressivity is moderate 
(log-concavity in prices) the increase in personal allowances would lead to an increase 
in the equal distribution of income after taxes. What also occurs with increasing 
personal deductions with income elasticity less than unity if the tax is proportional. 
However, they do not take into account the drop in revenue associated with increased 
personal allowances. This is a factor worth exploring for its own sake, especially in the 
current circumstances. But it also deserves special attention because it affects the very 
applicability of the results obtained by Keen et al (2000). When there is a minimum 
                                                            
1 A comprehensive analysis of the link between tax progressivity and inequality can be seen in the 
classical book by Lambert (1993). The distribution and redistribution of Income. A mathematical 
analysis, 2nd edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
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income exemption, things change considerably even with fixed rates where there is 
strong and sharp progressivity in the vicinity of the exempt amount (see paragraph 3 
and Figure 2 below).  
In the lower reaches of the income scale near the minimum exemption is likely not to 
maintain the conditions of applicability of the results of Keen et al (2000) about the 
progressivity in residual income (after-tax) and, generally not possible to speak of 
Lorenz dominance without compensating adjustments in the amount of revenue. To 
draw conclusions in terms of welfare it would be needed income distributions with the 
same mean (Theorem Atkinson, 1970) considering variations in average income and the 
degree of inequality under the principle of Shorrocks (1983) based on generalized 
Lorenz curves. However, this second possibility does not deserve much attention as the 
first, since it would imply significant declines in tax collection. 
The most interesting problem is analyzing the impact of personal allowances over the 
tax burden distribution under the assumption that the tax collection is held constant. In 
this line, this work shows the possibilities of extending the values of equity and social 
welfare in the income tax with fixed rates by means of the introduction of personal 
exemptions differentiated according to the standards of living of the taxpayers. We 
compare two methods of taxation (with revenues equal): the classic method (based on a 
strict minimum for all taxpayers) and the discretionary income method (based on 
differentiated personal exemptions according to taxpayers' living standards) to show 
that this proposal not only reduces the inequality in after-tax income distribution but 
unequivocally achieves social welfare improvements according to a wide range of 
welfare functions with inequality aversion (Atkinson, 1970).  
Personal deductions of nontaxable income have been analyzed by Tanzi (2009) as an 
important tool to improve equity in taxation. However, the effects of this option in 
terms of progressivity are rather limited due to the traditional conception of a strict 
minimum of nontaxable income equal for all taxpayers. In this paper we prove that an 
alternative criterion which substitutes the strict minimum of nontaxable income for a 
scheme of growing personal allowances to meet the amounts of necessary 
consumption2 according to the living standards associated to the different income levels 
                                                            
2 See section 2 for a definition of necessary consumption. 
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of the taxpayers, not only generates less unequal after-tax income distributions, but 
unambiguously increases income-tax progression and social welfare.  
Originally, in the first discussions about personal income taxation it was stated on, that 
the exemption of necessary consumption expenditures should be increased accordingly 
with living standards to meet the higher needs of people in the upper income bands. 
However when this idea was first suggested, it was considered to be unfair because of 
the commonly accepted principle that basic needs are the same for everyone. Rousseau 
(1755) strongly argued: “He who possesses only the common necessaries of life should 
pay nothing at all, while the tax on him who is in possession of superfluities may justly 
be extended to everything he has over and above the mere necessaries. To this he will 
possibly object that, when his rank is taken into account, what may be superfluous to a 
man of inferior station is necessary for a grandee. But this is false: for a grandee has 
two legs just like a cow-herd, and, like him again, but one belly.”(Rousseau, 1755, 
p.46). 
The concept of nontaxable necessary consumption expenditure has always been present 
in the analysis of tax systems. Stuart Mill (1951), one of the greatest exponents of 
modern economic philosophy, established that according to the principle of equal 
sacrifice there is a dramatic difference between a tax "that could be economized of 
luxury and one that curtails, albeit in very small degree, the necessary to live." 
Therefore taxes should “leave a certain minimum income sufficient to provide basic 
necessities of life” (Stuart Mill, 1951, p. 690). 
This paper demonstrates that when the exemption threshold is not set at a strict common 
minimum to all taxpayers but instead it increases with income to take into account the 
greater expenditure requirements associated to the living standards in the upper strata of 
income, the distribution of the tax burden becomes more progressive and it is clearly 
superior in terms of a social welfare function that values equality in the income 
distribution. This result implies an obvious paradox.  
Two forces: first, the fall in revenue since the rich pay less, secondly, the existence of 
the tax free allowance gives the tax a progressive structure, so the drop in revenues and 
an increase in the average income makes Lorenz curves the intersect in the lower strata. 
The proposition of Keen et al (2000) does not apply to the dominance in the lower 
strata, as the progressivity is rapid in the levels near the strict minimum allowance.  
5 
 
How is it possible that the proposed alternative criterion (growing personal allowances 
according to living standards) leads to a distribution of the tax burden more progressive 
and superior in terms of social welfare? When comparing alternative criteria for tax 
burden distribution a logical condition must be applied: the total amount of tax 
collection must be the same3. Once this condition is realized, the traditional confusion 
that richest people would pay less taxes with the proposed scheme of growing personal 
allowances disappears.  It can be disentangled by considering two key features in the 
distribution of a fixed amount of tax collection among all taxpayers: a) When only 
considering the reductions in the total amounts of tax liabilities in the upper strata of 
income, the logical condition of equal tax collection is violated; b) on the contrary, 
when the total amount of tax collection is kept the same, what really matters are the 
relative shares of personal tax deductions4 (taxable income) across the range of income 
levels. These relative shares of personal tax deductions in the proposed alternative tax 
method are much higher (lower) in the first tranches of income levels than in the upper 
part of the income distribution.  
In the paper we show that the technical reasons behind this result come from two main 
features of what is usually named as necessary consumption: a) necessary consumption 
grows more slowly than income (technically income elasticity lower than one) and b) 
necessary consumption increases at a decreasing rate with income. Therefore, on the 
one hand, for low income levels the share of personal deductions with the proposed tax 
method is much higher than the one resulting from applying a strict minimum of 
nontaxable income (traditional tax method) equal for all taxpayers implying low tax 
liabilities. On the other hand, for high income levels the income share of personal 
deductions with the proposed tax method is higher but in relative terms much closer to 
the ones resulting from applying the traditional tax method. Therefore, the tax burden 
distribution with the proposed tax method is more progressive than the one implied by 
applying the traditional notion of a strict minimum of nontaxable income equal for all 
taxpayers. In Rousseau’s words, “grandees” necessary consumption remains practically 
constant as income increases and this is the reason why they are punished under this 
alternative schedule of nontaxable income. This paradox can be termed as the 
Rousseau’s paradox of fiscal egalitarianism. 
                                                            
3 In the current literature (Moyes, 2003), this condition has been embedded in the technical concept of tax 
method. 
4 Strict minimum nontaxable income equal for all tax payers (traditional tax method) and a scheme of 
growing personal allowances according to living standards (proposed tax method) 
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The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 defines the concept of 
necessary consumption. Section 3 analyzes the distribution of effective tax rates 
(according to the criteria pointed out in Musgrave and Tun Thin, 1948)  resulting from 
two alternative schedules of personal deductions, a strict minimum of nontaxable 
income equal for all taxpayers and  a scheme of growing personal allowances of 
nontaxable income based on notion of necessary consumption. In section 4 both types 
of nontaxable income schedules are assessed in terms of a social welfare function and it 
is shown that when the proposed tax method is applied, the resulting after-tax income 
distribution is less unequal (Lorenz dominance) and superior in terms of social welfare 
(Atkinson, 1970).  Finally, section 5 contains the main conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
 
2. NECESSARY CONSUMPTION 
In the classical Adam Smith’s book “The wealth of nations” (1776) the cultural 
dimension of the notion of necessary consumption has been already highlighted in the 
following sentence: "not only the goods that are necessary for the preservation of life, 
but all those that the custom of the country makes improper for respectable people, even 
the lowest category, to be without them". (A. Smith, 1776, pp. 870-1). Nowadays, the 
concept of necessary consumption is fully embedded in the values and consumption 
habits of the households. It is important to bear in mind that there is not a closed 
definition of necessary consumption. Priority or basic needs are those that are first met. 
When income is low and the budgetary constraint is tight the optimal consumer 
decisions focus on priority or basic needs. When income grows and budgetary 
constraints are not so severe, other needs equally important but of lower priority are 
met. 
Necessary goods and services are associated with basic priorities (food, beverages, 
shoes, etc.) which take most of household budgets for low income levels. As income 
grows households increase the expenditure devoted to basic priorities (increasing the 
degree of satisfaction of these needs) but also allocate growing amounts of expenditure 
to the satisfaction of non-basic priorities (cars, trips, vacations and the like). According 
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to household values and current consumption patterns, the demand for necessary goods 
becomes rigid with respect to income.  
From a microeconomic point of view, the concept of necessary consumption can be 
defined as the expenditure on those goods and services verifying that their income 
elasticity is lower than one. From a statistical and operational point of view, the amount 
of income devoted to necessary consumption can be computed from the data on 
expenditure in the different kinds of goods and services gathered in household budget 
surveys5.  
 
Given a set of goods, j=1…m, and denoting by “xj(y)” the expenditure allocated to each 
type of goods as a function of the personal incomes “y”, the subset of necessary goods 
can be defined as those having an income-elasticity less than one,  
 1... / 1 with ixi n n m   .   ix represents the income-elasticity of the expenditure in 
good i, xi6, given by the following expression: 
                                 '1
i i i
i
i i
x x x
i
dx
x dxdy S sx y dy
y
           [1] 
As it can be seen in the right side of expression [1], by rearranging the definition of 
income elasticity, we get that average expenditure shares in necessary goods, 
ix
S ,  are 
greater than the corresponding marginal expenditure shares, '
ix
s . This implies that 
average expenditure shares in necessary goods,
ix
S , are a decreasing function of 
personal income (y). This technical condition captures the intuitive meaning that 
necessary priorities are first met by those households placed in the bottom part of the 
range of incomes. 
Once the set of necessary goods has been determined  1... ,i i n n mx   , necessary 
consumption, NC(y), can be computed summing over the amounts of household 
                                                            
5 For a detailed analysis of the microeconomic tools and econometric techniques that allow estimating 
necessary consumption see Deaton and Mullbauer (1980). More recently an applied analysis to the 
Pakistan case can be seen in Schamim and Ahmad (2006). 
6 “xi” represents the expenditure in the good “I” in monetary terms.  
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expenditure to buy necessary goods and services in the set   1... ,i i n n mx    according to the 
following expression: 
1
( ) ( )n iiNC y x y            [2] 
The average share of necessary consumption, SNC(y), can be given by the proportion of 
necessary consumption on total personal income, ( )( )NC
NC yS y
y
 .  The marginal share 
of necessary consumption, s'NC(y), can be given by the proportion of additional income 
that is spent in necessary goods. Mathematically it is given by differentiating expression 
[3] with respect to income, ( )' ( )NC
dNC ys y
dy
 .      
                                                                                                         
The condition on income elasticity that must be satisfied by the expenditures in 
necessary goods, implies that the average share of necessary consumption on income,  
SNC(y), is a decreasing function of personal incomes: 
'
'( )1 ( ) ( )
( )
NC
NC NC NC
NC
s y S y s y
S y
        [3]                             
 
3. SURPLUS INCOME TAX METHOD VS DISCRETIONARY INCOME 
TAX METHOD  
Let us consider a distribution of income (y), being it a continuous variable over the 
interval [a,m],  ,y a m , where a and m denote respectively the minimum and 
maximum levels for personal incomes.  
Let f(y) denotes the density function of personal income distribution, so that the 
cumulative frequency of taxpayers with earnings lower than or equal to y is given by: 
( ) ( )
y
a
F y f y dy            [4]                                
We can now compare the tax rate structures of the two income tax methods: the 
traditional one with a strict minimum of nontaxable income equal for all taxpayers and 
our proposal of growing personal allowances according to the levels of necessary 
consumption associated to the different living standards.  
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a) The traditional tax method (Surplus income tax method) is associated to an 
income tax over the surplus income exceeding the strict minimum of nontaxable 
income, a, at flat tax rate, t’s, and 
b) The alternative proposal (Discretionary income tax method) is associated to an 
income tax over the discretionary income exceeding necessary consumption, 
NC(y), at a flat tax rate, t’d. 
In the case of the surplus income tax method, tax liabilities, Ts, and effective rates ts are 
given by the expressions:  
'
' ( )( ) ( )     and      with y ass s s
t y aT y t y a t
y
       [5] 
The total tax collection of the surplus income tax method is the result of applying the 
tax rate t’s to the income surplus (y- a). The marginal tax rate, t’s , is constant and equal 
to the flat tax rate, t’s. 
's
s
dT t
dy
           [6]                                   
A discretionary income tax method with a flat rate, t’d, provides tax liabilities, Td and 
effective rates, td, according to the following expressions: 
'
' ( ( ))( ) ( ( ))     and       with y add d d
t y NC yT y t y NC y t
y
       [7]                            
In the discretionary income tax method, marginal rates have a more complex structure 
than those under the surplus income tax method because they depend on the marginal 
share of necessary consumption, s’NC(y). Marginal rates under the discretionary income 
tax method are given by the following expression:  
      ' ( ) ( )1  where 0< 1d ddT dNC y dNC ytdy dy dy
            [8]                                   
The derivative of necessary consumption with respect to income ranges from 0 
[ ( )lim 0
y
dNC y
dy
 ] and 1 [ ( )lim 1
y a
dNC y dNC
dy dNC
  ]. We work with the 
assumption that for the minimum personal income level, a, all income is devoted to 
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high-priority goods7. In the extreme case of a taxpayer with the level of minimum 
income, a, no tax liabilities are generated [t'd (1-1) = 0]. As the personal income level 
increases a surplus over the income devoted to necessary consumption emerges. This 
surplus is going to be termed as “discretionary income”, yd=y-NC(y), and therefore 
makes the taxable income in the discretionary income tax method.  
 Marginal shares of necessary consumption are a decreasing function of personal 
income.  Once taxpayers have covered their basic needs, they can devote a greater share 
of their income to non-priority goods. Therefore tax liabilities under this tax method 
grow more than proportionally as personal income increases.  
Graph 1 shows the evolution of tax liabilities, Ts and Td respectively under the two tax 
methods. Tax liabilities Ts under the SITM grow at a constant rate t’s in the whole range 
of incomes, in a different way tax liabilities under the DITM grow at the increasing rate 
given by the expression: t’d [1-s’NC(y)]8. In the bottom part of the personal income 
distribution [a, y*] tax liabilities are lower under the DITM than those under the SITM. 
The rationale behind this behavior of tax liabilities is twofold: 1) A taxable income 
effect: necessary consumption (the personal allowances under the DITM) is always 
equal or greater than the strict minimum of nontaxable income, a, under the SITM, 
therefore taxable incomes under the DITM are always lower than those in the SITM. 2) 
A flat rate effect: Due to the fact that total tax collection must be the same to rightly 
compare both tax methods, the flat rate, t’d, in the DITM must be greater than the flat 
rate, t’s, in the SITM. The combined action of taxable income and flat rate effects 
determine the pattern of tax liabilities for both tax methods. 
In the bottom part of the personal income distribution the taxable income effect is very 
low due to the fact that necessary consumption takes a high share of personal incomes9 
implying that even having a greater flat rate tax liabilities under the DITM are lower 
than those under the SITM. In SITM tax liabilities grow at a constant rate, t’s, while in 
the DITM they grow at an increasing rate, t’d [1-s’NC(y)], consequently there is a 
threshold of personal income level, y*>a, in which tax liabilities are the same under 
                                                            
7 It is important to bear in mind that this assumption does not imply any loss of generality, because of no 
tax liabilities are generated under the threshold a.  
8 It is important to bear in mind that s’NC(y) is a decreasing function of personal income, y, and its values 
lay in the interval [1,0) for personal incomes in the interval [a,∞). 
9 Note that the share of necessary consumption over personal income, SNC(y),  is a decreasing function of 
personal income varying monotonously between lim ( ) 1S YNCY a
 and  lim ( ) 0S YNCy   
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both methods10. Below this threshold, y*, there is a level of personal income, y , where 
the difference between tax liabilities, Ts - Td , reaches a global maximum11.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Tax Liabilities 
 
Following Musgrave and Thin (1948) the degree of progressivity of the two tax 
methods can be compared by looking at average and marginal tax rates.  Average tax 
rates are considered to be progressive if they increase as income increases.  
Mathematically, the average tax rate for the SITM is given by the following expression:  
'
'( ) (1 ) with ss s
t y a at t y a
y y
      
 [9]                             
The average tax rate can be broken down into the flat rate ( 'st ) and the factor 1
a
y
     
which approaches to 0 for low income levels ( y a ) and to 1 for very high income 
levels. Moreover, the factor 1 a
y
    grows quickly as income departs from the 
minimum of personal income, a. This means the average tax rate will grow very fast in 
the first tranches of income.  
                                                            
10 The income threshold (y*) for which both tax methods generate the same tax liabilities is given by the 
following condition:   ' '* , / ( * ) ( * ( *))y a m t y a t y NC ys d    .    
11 y is characterized by the condition  t’s = t’d [1-s’NC(y)]. 
y   y* 
t’s
Td = t’d (y‐NC(y)) 
Y
Ts=t’s (y‐a) 
T
a 
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In the case of the DITM, the average tax rate is given by the following expression: 
'
'( ( )) ( ) = 1 with y ( ) add d
t y NC y NC yt t NC y
y y
                            [10] 
In a similar way to the SITM, there are two factors affecting the average tax rates: the 
flat rate, 'dt , and the factor 
( )1 NC y
y
    .  Comparing this factor with the 
previous one, it can be easily seen that for low income levels; the factor 
( )1 NC y
y
   grows more slowly than 1
a
y
     due to the fact that NC(y) is an 
increasing function of income. Therefore average tax rates grow more slowly under the 
DITM than under the SITM meaning that in terms of progressivity DITM is preferred 
than the SITM.  
Pigou (1928) suggested another alternative measure of tax progressivity which is based 
on the variation of average tax rates with respect to income. When this variation is 
positive the tax is progressive, being more progressive the larger the rate of variation.  
Under Pigou’s approach, taking first derivatives with respect to income in [12] and [13] 
we can compare the progressivity degrees of the SITM and the DITM respectively. 
In the case of the SITM we obtain the following expression:  
'
2
s
s
dt at
dy y
        [11]                             
Expression [15] presents always positive values due to the fact that all its components 
are positive. Additionally, taking into account that a is constant and the denominator is 
the level of income to the power two, the slope of ts will decrease rapidly as the level of 
income increases.  
In the case of DITM, we obtain:  
'
' '
2
( ) . ( )
d NC NC
d d
NC y y NC yt S syt t
y y y
             
  [12] 
Expression [15] presents also positive values due to the fact that SNC>s’NC (an 
implication from the definition of necessary consumption –income elasticity being 
lower than one).  
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An interesting conclusion results from the comparison of expressions [14] and [15]: the 
DITM is less progressive than the SITM in the lower tranches of income up to the 
income threshold ys12. Above this threshold the slope of average tax rates in the SITM 
falls very quickly and its average tax rates approach very soon to the value of its flat 
rate, t’s. On the contrary, in the DITM above the income threshold ys the escalation of 
its effective tax rates continues with a higher slope approaching asymptotically to its flat 
rate, t’d , which is greater than the one in the SITM because of the logical condition of 
keeping the same amount of total tax collection under both tax methods. 
 
Figure 2: Average Tax Rates under SITM and DITM  
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, average tax rates in the SITM are above those in the DITM 
up to the income threshold ye which can be easily determined from expressions [12] and 
[13]: 
' 1 ( )
' 1
s
d
t NC y
t a
          [13] 
                                                            
12 ys   income threshold satisfies the following condition: 
' '
'
t S ss NC NC y
t ad
  
ye ys 
t’d 
t’s 
Y 
SITM 
DITM 
a 
at  = t'  (1- )ys s
d d
( )t  = t'  (1- )NC yy
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4. ASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
After describing and analyzing in terms of progressivity the SITM and DITM tax 
methods in the previous section, in the present one we undertake the comparative 
analysis of them in terms of social welfare. In order to do such a comparison the 
analysis will be based on the well-known Atkinson theorem (1970).  It will be shown 
that the DITM based on growing personal allowances for necessary consumption levels 
according to living standards is preferred in terms of a social welfare function and 
produces a fairer after-tax income distribution than the SITM based on a strict minimum 
of nontaxable income equal for all taxpayers.  
Atkinson (1970) theorem proves that when we compare two income distributions which 
have the same average, the one showing a more equal distribution applying Lorenz 
criterion is clearly superior to the other according to a wide variety of individualistic, 
symmetric,  additively separable  and inequality averse social welfare functions.  
Let us F(y) denote a cumulative distribution function of income, where y is a continuous 
variable ranging from a minimum of income, a, up to a maximum of income, m, 
 ,y a m . Let f(y) denotes the corresponding density function of the considered 
income distribution.  The total number of taxpayers with an income less or equal than y 
is given by: 
 ( ) ( )
y
a
F y f y dy       [14] 
Total tax collection in the SITM is given by the following expression:  
' '. . ( ) . ( ) .
m m
s s sa a
TC t y f y dy a f y dy t SY          [15] 
Where SY refers to the aggregate of surplus income resulting from the sum of incomes 
exceeding the strict minimum of nontaxable income, a, over the whole set of taxpayers. 
In the case of the DITM, total tax collection is given by:   
' '. . ( ) . ( ) .
m m
d d da a
TC t y f y dy NC f y dy t DY          [16] 
Where DY refers to the aggregate of discretionary income which is the sum of incomes 
exceeding necessary consumption, NC(y), over the whole set of taxpayers. 
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The logical condition for comparison purposes of the two alternative tax methods, 
namely, the same amount of total tax collection, implies the following relation between 
them:  
' '. .s dTC t SY t DY   ' 's dDYt tSY     [17] 
 
Taking into account that DY<SY, the flat tax rates 'st and 
'
dt  must verify:  
' '
s dt t       [18] 
The key condition for applying the Atkinson (1970) theorem, namely, the two income 
distributions must have the same mean, in our case is guarantee by the logical condition 
that the two alternative tax methods, SITM and DITM, must collect the same amount of 
taxes, TCs (total tax collection under SITM), and TCd (Total tax collection under 
DITM).  It is also straightforward to check the fulfillment of this condition. Both after-
tax income distributions therefore verify the following condition:  
s d s dTC TC Y TC Y TC         [19] 
Let denote by 1 ( )( )s yF y T the after-tax cumulative income distribution under SITM and 
by 2 ( )( )d yF y T   the after-tax cumulative income distribution under DITM, where 
( )s yT and ( )d yT  denote respectively the corresponding tax liabilities under both tax 
methods, SITM and DITM.  
In order to apply Atkinson’s (1970) theorem, we are going to consider a twice 
continuously differentiable, additively separable, symmetric and with inequality 
aversion utility function, U(y), to build a social welfare function, W, of individual 
incomes.  
' ''( ) ( ) , ( ) : ( ) 0, ( ) 0
m
a
W U y f y dy U y U y U y        [20] 
The Atkinson theorem (1970) allows evaluating in terms of social welfare (by means of 
the function W) both income tax methods: the surplus income tax method, SITM , and 
the discretionary income tax method, DITM. Applying Atkinson’s (1970) results to 
compare in terms of social welfare the two alternative tax methods under analysis it can 
be shown that for any social welfare function of the type W the after-tax income 
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distribution under the DITM is preferred to the after-tax income distribution under the 
SITM, because the following condition is satisfied:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m m
d sa a
U y T f y dy U y T f y dy       [21] 
according to Atkinson’s (1970) theorem, condition in expression [24] is hold when 
after-tax income distribution Lorenz curve under the DITM method is less unequal than 
the after-tax income distribution Lorenz curve under the SITM. As both after-tax 
income distribution have the same mean (because of the amount of total tax collection is 
the same), their respective Lorenz curves do not intersect, so the comparison can be 
based on their proximity to the equal distribution 45º line.  In order to carry out this 
comparison let us define the cumulative shares of population ordered by income 
levels, ( )y , and the corresponding cumulative shares of after-tax incomes, 
( ), ,
iy T
i d s   , under the alternative discretionary income and surplus income tax 
methods. Figure 3 shows the shapes of the two Lorenz curves of after-tax income 
distribution under both tax methods DITM and SITM. 
 
Figure 3: After-tax Income Distributions Lorenz Curves: DITM vs. SITM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a positive value for the share of individuals 
earning the strict minimum nontaxable income, a, ( ) 0a  . It is straightforward that 
( )y  is an increasing function of y and therefore at the maximum level of income, m, 
( ) 1m  .  
 
ρ(m)=1 
α(ρ(m))=1 
αy‐td 
α(ρ(a)) 
αy‐ts
ρ(a)
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In terms of the Lorenz curve variables depicted in Figure 3 the DITM is socially 
preferred to the SITM when the following condition applies: 
( ) ( ), [ ,1]
d sy T y T
a          [22] 
In SITM, which applies a strict minimum of nontaxable income equal for all taxpayers, 
the cumulative tax liabilities for taxpayers with an income equal or lower than y is given 
by:  
'( ) ( ) ( )
y
s y sa
T t y a f y dy        [23] 
Where for the sake of simplicity y  has the same meaning as ( )y . Therefore for m , 
the total tax collection in SITM is given by:  
' '( ) ( ) ( ) .
m
s m s sa
TC t y a f y dy t SY       [24] 
In the case of DITM, which applies growing personal allowances of necessary 
consumption according to living standards, the cumulative tax collection for y is given 
by the following expression: 
'( ) ( ( )) ( )
y
d y da
T t y NC y f y dy       [25] 
Therefore for m , the total tax collection for this tax method is: 
' '( ) ( ( )) ( ) .
m
d m d da
TC t y NC y f y dy t DY       [26] 
After-tax income distribution Lorenz curves under the SITM and DITM are computed 
by substracting the corresponding tax liabilities, Ts and Td, from the before-tax personal 
income, y. Consequently, their respective expressions are given by:   
' ( )
st s
y y t y a        [27] 
' ( ( ))
dt d
y y t y NC y                                       [28] 
The cumulative after-tax income distributions under the SITM, ( )
st
Y y , and DITM, 
( )
dt
Y y , are respectively given by the following expressions:   
 ( ) ' ( ) ( ) . ( ) ' ( ) ( )
s
y y y
t s sa a a
Y y y t y a f y dy y f y dy t y a f y dy         [29] 
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 ( ) ' ( ( ) ( ) . ( ) ' ( ( ) ( )
d
y y y
t d da a a
Y y y t y NC y f y dy y f y dy t y NC y f y dy         [30] 
So the corresponding income shares, ( ), ,
it
y i s d   , in the after-tax income 
distribution Lorenz curves for SITM and DITM are respectively given by: 
. ( ) ' ( ) ( ) . ( ) ' ( ) ( )
( )
' .. ( ) ' ( ) ( )
s
y y y y
s sa a a a
t m m
ssa a
y f y dy t y a f y dy y f y dy t y a f y dy
y
Y t SYy f y dy t y a f y dy
        
   
    [31]
 
. ( ) ( ( )) ( ) . ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( )
.. ( ) ( ( )) ( )
d
y y y y
d da a a a
t m m
dda a
y f y dy t y NC y f y dy y f y dy t y NC y f y dy
y
Y t DYy f y dy t y NC y f y dy
        
   
       [32] 
According to Atkinson’s (1970) theorem DITM would be preferred to SITM if the 
following condition is satisfied:  
( ) ( )
s dt t
y y         [33] 
Or equivalently, taking into account expressions [34] and [35], the next one must be 
hold: 
. ( ) ' ( ) ( ) ' .
' .. ( ) ' ( ( )) ( )
y y
sa a s
y y
dda a
y f y dy t y a f y dy Y t SY
Y t DYy f y dy t y NC y f y dy
    
 
      [34] 
Proof:  
According to the logical condition of keeping the same amount of tax collection under 
the two tax methods under analysis, we know that:  
' . ' . ' 's d d s
SYt SY t DY t t
DY
                        [35] 
Substituting expression [38] in expression [37] and dividing by the aggregate before-tax 
income, Y, we obtain the following expression: 
' ( ) ( )
. ( ) '
( ( )) ( ) ' .
. ( ) ' .
y
y s a
sa
y
y sa
sa
t y a f y dy SYy f y dy Y t
Y Y
SYy NC y f y dy Y t DYSYy f y dy t DY Y
DY Y
 

 


    [36] 
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The right hand side of inequality [39] is equal to 1. Therefore this inequality implies: 
( ) ( )
( ( )) ( )
y
a
y
a
y a f y dy SY
DYy NC y f y dy
 


                        [37] 
This clearly holds across the whole relevant range of incomes (a, m].  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Under the classical view, the rationale for a strict minimum of nontaxable income (equal 
for all taxpayers) is only justified as a benefit to those taxpayers in the lowest income 
brackets to prevent confiscatory taxes. The reason behind this is that low level income 
earners remain with enough after-tax income to consume what is considered as the strict 
minimum "necessary for living". 
In this paper we show that the classical notion of a strict minimum of nontaxable 
income equal for all taxpayers to a great extent lacks of a logical justification in terms of 
progressivity and social welfare. This rather surprising result could be termed as a 
Rousseaunian paradox on fiscal egalitarianism.  
In this paper we have defined, discussed and compared the traditional surplus income 
tax method (SITM) with our proposal of an alternative discretionary income tax 
method, DITM, based on growing personal allowances for necessary consumption 
according to living standards. We have proved that DITM is a more progressive tax 
method (according with the usual criteria in Musgrave-Thin, 1948, and Pigou,1928) not 
only benefiting lower income individuals but also reducing inequality and improving 
the after-tax income distribution in terms of social welfare (Atkinson, 1970). 
Our results can have important policy implications. The most straightforward one is that 
under our proposal of discretionary income taxation it is possible to reach progressivity 
in personal income taxation and improving equity in the after-tax income distribution by 
means of pure flat rate schemes. Future research avenues to explore these possibilities in 
different fiscal and socio-economic backgrounds can lead to very interesting results. 
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